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The Coexistence and Interaction of Formal and Informal Lending in China - 
Discussion of the Wenzhou Case 
Abstract: Interest in China’s economy has typically been focused on its phenomenal growth. 
However, more recently there has been growing interest in emerging constraints on and 
vulnerabilities regarding that growth. A key focus has been concern with issues of shadow 
banking. This paper discusses one aspect of China’s finance system, which has some crossover 
with shadow banking: informal lending to private enterprises (PE). This lending is 
characteristically unstable and exhibits a number of features that constrain private enterprises. 
Intrinsic to those constraints are issues of usury, bribery and rent-seeking (as an expression of 
power), all of which bear on the institutional context of ethics. This paper discusses the case of 
Wenzhou, the most prominent city for private enterprises in China. The Wenzhou case is 
explored using a narrative form drawing on multiple sources including academic papers, 
regulation, newspapers and social media. This is an increasingly recognized approach within 
mixed methods research and this paper provides for important qualitative insight into how and 
why questions regarding the Wenzhou case. The Wenzhou case is typical in terms of the 
coexistence and interaction of formal and informal lending in China. Finally, we highlight the 
limits of the recent reform process and current approach to resolving the problem of financing 
for PEs in China. 
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1. Introduction 
The particular strategy of economic reform in China over the last few decades has created a 
number of tensions. In general the tendency to approach reform as an incremental process, 
where relatively straightforward or uncontroversial changes are made first, has meant that 
many of the more complex or difficult reforms have been left until later. Additional problems 
may then arise because of this deferment. As a result, the state is sometimes confronted by the 
challenge of cumulative problems in particular aspects of the economy. One key area in which 
problems have been experienced in China is business financing. The historical legacy of 
China’s command economy has been a relative dominance of large state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in terms of policy focus. This has extended also to a dominance of the finance system 
by state owned and state controlled banks within a highly centralised approach to regulation 
and policy. State banks have tended to focus on the financing of SOEs. Since they dominate 
the formal lending system this has meant that many private enterprises (PEs), the majority are 
micro and small in size, have found it necessary to seek alternative sources of funding. As such 
an informal financing system has developed. The relation between the formal and informal 
systems is both complex and ambiguous. The informal system does not exist entirely beyond 
the state’s purview because some of its agents can be state actors operating in the shadow 
banking system (Liang 2016), and because some of its practices have been developed in 
specific localities designated by the state for experimental reform.  
 
   The informal system in China demonstrates a number of significant distortions in finance 
markets. Given that these affect PEs, then these distortions are of great significance for the 
stability and growth potential of the Chinese economy. An experimental approach has been 
another typical feature of Chinese economic reform. It involves the loosening of existing 
regulatory control in a particular locality, creating spaces for innovation, as well as the 
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introduction of new opportunities for institutions, which if successful may then be rolled out 
across China. These localities then also acquire an additional first mover status becoming nodal 
points for some form of economic activity. As such the following paper sets out different 
aspects of the emergence and consequences of informality based on the case of Wenzhou City. 
Wenzhou has emerged as China’s premier location for PEs, and as such has experienced a 
range of problems based on informal lending and these can be seen as indicative of issues likely 
to be experienced elsewhere. This paper adopts a narrative form based on multiple sources 
including academic papers, regulation, newspapers and social media. Based on these sources 
as a mixed methods approach the paper provides readers with a number of significant insights. 
These concern:  (1) the main cause of huge funding gaps for PEs in China, (2) whether and 
how ‘local power’ can play a role in mitigating funding shortages for local PEs, (3) how formal 
and informal lending coexist and interact in China, as conceived through the lens of the 
Wenzhou case, and (4) why recent regulation, reforms and policy changes in 2014 are limited 
as means to resolve problems PEs face in business financing.  The argument in this paper is 
broadly embedded in the debate about the concurrence of China’s under-developed financial 
markets, weak legal and institutional context, and the interacting mechanisms of formal and 
informal finance in China (e.g. Alford 2000; Pei 2001; Li 2001; Clarke 2003; Tsai 2004, 2015; 
Allen et al. 2005; Pistor and Xu 2005; Lu and Yao 2009; Yao and Yueh 2009; Hsu 2012). We 
also draw attention throughout the paper to arising issues of ethical concern. 
 
   The paper proceeds in 5 sections. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to Wenzhou in the 
context of its prominence as a site of informal financing. Section 3 sets out the causal context 
of a ‘funding gap’ experienced by Chinese PEs. Section 4 explores the roles of Wenzhou local 
government and business associations. Section 5 explores the reciprocities between formal and 
informal financing based on some typical examples (many of which can be found elsewhere in 
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China). Section 6 discusses the emerging solutions to the arising problems of finance, based 
on the Chinese reform model: experimental local institutional change, which the state then 
intends to generalise; specifically, the ‘Wenzhou City Private Financing Regulation’. Here the 
limits of this policy change has been highlighted. Finally, the conclusion (Section 7) 
summarises what we have achieved in the paper.  
 
2. Wenzhou city as a site of informal finance 
Wenzhou is a prefecture-level port city located in the South East corner of the coastal province 
of Zhejiang with a population of approximately 9 million. Wenzhou’s annual GDP per capita 
is twice the national average (Qin et al. 2014). As a corollary Wenzhou has a comparatively 
developed informal lending market. Informal lending constitutes approximately 30% of all 
lending in the city, significantly higher than the national average of 8% (Guo and Liu 2002). 
As such, Wenzhou has long been recognized in the Chinese media as the national capital of 
both “informal lending” and “private enterprise” (see examples, Liu 1992; Parris 1993; Wu 
2006; Qin et al. 2014).  
 
   Though strategically located in terms of some aspects of modern supply chains, in historical 
context Wenzhou has experienced political isolation (it is some distance from the provincial 
capital, Hangzhou) and is located in a mountainous region with little arable land. This has had 
some bearing on local culture. Local self-reliance and trade have been enduring features of that 
culture. During particular periods of crisis Wenzhou has also experienced significant out-
migration and thus contributed to the Chinese diaspora and to the phenomenon of huaqiao 
(overseas Chinese business networks). Wenzhou migrants in South East Asia, Europe and the 
Middle East have retained links with the city and a strong sense of a Wenzhou identity. These 
migrants have over the years provided a ready source of business acumen, investment and 
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remittances. A sense of a Wenzhou identity is thus cross-pollinated (Parris 1993; Qin et al. 
2014).  
 
   Wenzhou became a major trading port in South East China as early as the tenth century (Liu 
1992). Local capital shortages quickly became an issue and varieties of hui based funding were 
developed. Hui translates roughly as people who know each other well, and in terms of 
financing refers to locally pooled capital lent at interest (expressed in the bi-syllabic of the 
Chinese language based on different types of groupings and purposes of financing – friends, 
village etc., becoming hehui, biaohui, chenghui and so forth). The system has some of the 
characteristics of contemporary crowd-funding though it has traditionally been classified with 
rotating saving and credit associations and referred to as minjian jiedai (people’s credit, a curb-
side market, etc.; see Tsai 2004).  
  
   Wenzhou was one of the first localities to begin to develop PEs after the beginning of reform 
(Liu 1992). Small private firm owners did not require large capital sums, lacked any 
longstanding bank accounts, and often had few political connections to expedite access. They 
constituted both a political and economic risk (which was not offset by any formal – rather than 
graft based - realisable profit motive within the state lending system). As such, the hui system 
– which during previous years had persisted in a variety of concealed ways – re-emerged.1 By 
1986 an estimated 95% of Wenzhou households were engaged in hui based lending (Tsai 2000). 
There was a strong motive for this kind of behaviour on behalf of the lenders; the reform 
process had reinvigorated a cash economy but trust in the state bank system was low, interest 
rates offered in the state-owned banks were also low, and local inflation though variable was 
typically higher than bank interest rates. Hui based lending offered the opportunity of achieving 
                                                          
1See, [Jingji ribao] [Economic Daily] (2005). [Wenzhou minjian jiedai diaocha] [Survey on Wenzhou Informal Lending], 10 
June, p.13.   
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considerably higher rates of return and based on local knowledge through which some apparent 
risk could be mitigated. Once locked in as a viable institutional solution to capital shortages 
the informal system simply continued to reproduce itself through the continued activity of 
participants. A 2011 survey carried out by the Wenzhou Branch of People’s Bank of China 
estimated that 89% of Wenzhou residents and 60% of firms were continuing to participate in 
informal lending, in a market valued at approximately 110 billion RMB.2 
 
   A key point here is that a weak institutional focus on a basic problem, in this case the 
financing of a dynamic new area of the economy (PEs), creates a gap.3 A solution emerges 
based on existing (if historical) practices. Thereafter, the basis of China’s economic reform 
strategy – the deferment of some important structural reforms – serves to perpetuate the 
“solution”. China has not engaged in a full liberalisation of banking services in order to 
incentivise a range of banks to offer funding and effective support to PEs. A key issue is that 
the local informal solution creates unintended and problematic consequences. Specifically, the 
informal financing system is inherently unstable and prone to cycles of crisis. Capital pools are 
formed with an expectation of beating the returns available from the banks. Those who cannot 
borrow from the banks access this capital. They do so whilst paying rates higher than offered 
by the banks. Interest rates charged in the informal system can vary from 18-40% (Wu 2011). 
This phenomenon proved private entrepreneurs can “develop mechanisms to get around weak 
institutions” (Marceline and Mathur 2014, p. 32). The initial success of lending attracts further 
capital to the informal system and this can broaden the availability of capital to more borrowers, 
potentially reducing the credit quality of accepted borrowers. At the same time, borrowers must 
meet payments at relatively high interest rates. This creates scope for problems of debt 
                                                          
2 See, [Jinrong shibao - FT Chinese] (2011). [Wenzhou minjian jiedai shichang diaocha - Survey on Wenzhou Informal 
Lending market], 22 August, p.9. 
3By the end of 2011, there were 76,400 private enterprises (siying qiye, employing 8 or over labours by regulation) and 
332,900 family/individual businesses (getihu, with less than 8 employees) in Wenzhou (see Lin 2012).  
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servicing. Some borrowers may take out other loans to cover existing ones. So the absolute 
scale of debt can be increasing for different reasons and there can be a problem of greater 
leverage. This is a problem for all participants. A threshold may be reached creating widespread 
liquidity and insolvency problems. These may start a feedback loop because of multiple loans 
and because lenders may be participants in several schemes. Crucially, the system lacks 
institutional supports and so all sides can be wiped out. The specific mechanism in the Chinese 
case – exemplified by Wenzhou - is PE financing. Note, however, this is not just a problem of 
the informal sector; it bleeds also into the formal sector based on the exploitation of interstices 
in the formal sector (see Section 4). The point is that even though PEs are able to access 
financing, they are doing so based on higher rates and an uncertain service. So, the system can 
potentially harm investment, expansion and profitability because of instability, lack of proper 
institutional structure, and because of prejudicial interest rates. Business financing is, then, 
distorted.   
  
   Wenzhou has experienced several financing crises centred on minjian jiedai. The most recent 
serious crisis occurred in 2011-12. In early 2011 the state, aware that its fiscal and monetary 
expansion after the global financial crisis was creating problems of asset bubbles across China, 
began to tighten monetary policy. Tightening monetary policy in a system with significant 
amounts of informal lending is a calculated risk. Tightening monetary policy is both a 
mechanistic instrument of economic policy and a warning. Tightening within the formal 
banking system also increases the current dependence on the informal system for those who 
need access to financing. As such, reduced lending through the formal system and higher 
lending rates feed through into greater demands on the informal system, and the scope for 
informal lenders to charge higher rates.  The additional pressure this created meant that from 
April to September 2011 Wenzhou experienced a widely reported credit crunch resulting in a 
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wave of defaults in the informal system. More than 90 entrepreneurs (some are well-known) 
fled the city (this was reported as paolu) and went into hiding in order to escape their creditors 
and there were several reported suicides.4 So significant was this crisis (both in scale of capital 
at risk and in terms of its symbolism across the nation, given Wenzhou’s status) that in October 
2011, then Premier Wen Jiabao visited Wenzhou in a very public show of concern and support. 
The main banks were ordered to direct additional lending to PEs in order to reduce the tax 
burden on private firms’ VAT and sales tax rates were also reduced on a national basis.5 
Lending by edict, however, is not an appropriate solution to a problem of institutional weakness 
and clearly the state is aware of this. In March 2012, China’s State Council approved a 
Wenzhou pilot scheme for comprehensive financial reform to support private business 
financing via better controlled small banking enterprises.  
 
   In November 2013 the Zhejiang Provincial People’s Congress passed “The Wenzhou City 
Private Financing Regulation”. This is widely recognised as the beginning of legislation to 
address the issues created by the informal financing market in China. It is, however, only the 
beginning. It does not yet have any clear substance (see Section 6 for discussions and analysis).  
 
3. The problem of monopoly: Informal finance and the funding gap 
Banking in China continues to be dominated by a small number of state-owned or state 
controlled banks. The ‘Big Four’ are still entirely owned by the state as are what are termed 
policy banks.6 The state is also the majority shareholder in the joint stock commercial banks, 
and has the capacity to directly intervene in an arbitrary way in the operations of any other 
                                                          
4 See e.g. [Zhongguo zhengquan bao - China Securities Journal] (2011). [Bufen zhongxiao qiye shenxian gaolidai nitan - 
Some SMEs in deep mire of usury] 20 Oct 2011, p.A03. 
5 See[Xin jing bao][Beijing News], cited by http://www.sina.com.cn, 11/6/ 2012. [accessed 5.7.14]. 
6 The Big Four includes: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the 
Bank of China (BOC) and the China Construction Bank (CCB). 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
9 
 
bank and this includes any nominally private bank. Private banks (e.g. Minsheng Bank) operate 
under close restrictions.7 Foreign banks only have access to the Chinese market as minority 
participants in state-owned or controlled banks (Liang 2012). The state has resisted greater 
liberalisation and diversification of the banking system for a variety of reasons. A direct line 
into the banks ensures that any aspect of fiscal or monetary policy can be translated into rapid 
action through edict. The state is also able to manage the development and (in principle) 
ultimate divestment of the large state owned industries. Both the capacity for rapid direct action 
and the focus on SOEs enable centralised management of economic issues that are ultimately 
also matters of political stability. Importantly, the state is also able to deal directly with any 
emerging issues of financial stability arising for the solvency of given banks, based on non-
performing loans. The tension here is that it is the continued shaping of financial policy 
according to particular political imperatives that helps to create the potential for instability. The 
state is then caught between recognizing and fostering a more decentred and arm’s length 
approach to banking – in order to conform to international standards and encourage modern 
financial activity – and accepting the risks this entails (the different problems of financial 
instability that arise in a private banking system based on issues of financialisation).  
 
   China is in many respects moving towards conformity with international standards but has 
not shed the characteristics of state control. In 2012, 72% of China’s banking assets were 
controlled by the state, of which the “Big Four” constituted 48%, the joint stock commercial 
banks 15%, and the policy banks 9% (Clennam 2012). It can then be vulnerable to problems 
arising from both modern financial activity and from the arbitrary power potentials of the use 
and abuse of state power. Significantly, the existence of this concentration creates a further 
distortion. State-owned and controlled banks enjoy both a formal and informal guarantee from 
                                                          
7 See, [Zhengquan ribao - Securities Daily] (2013). [Fangkai minjian ziben ban yinhang zhengdang qishi - It is the right time 
to start private banks] 8 July 2013, p.3.  
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the state and also access to financing and investment opportunities that are denied others. As 
such, they access capital cheaply, engage in lending on a large scale more freely, earn returns 
based on market privilege and are forgiven any arising problematic debts.  
 
State-owned or controlled banks are focused primarily on servicing large SOEs. They have few 
incentives to extend business financing and services to PEs. This problem is longstanding (Wu 
et al. 2008). In 2000 the private sector received less than 1% of the total lending made available 
from the formal banking system (Tsai 2002). In a small World Bank survey in 2003 only 20% 
of respondents obtained bank loans as part of their business financing (Ayyagari et al. 2010). 
According to the 2013 Survey on the Chinese Banking Industry ‘small loans’ still only 
accounted for 14.6% of the market in 2012.8 There is then on a national basis a continuing 
problem of financing for the 30 million private enterprises currently operating in China. These 
now contribute more than 80% of urban employment, more than 60% of GDP, and more than 
50% of tax revenues.9  
 
   So, informal financing services a recognized need on a local basis. Not only is it called forth 
by the lack of access to formal lending it also has some advantages, particularly for PEs 
working at a local level and requiring relatively small capital sums. Local knowledge and 
personal connections potentially overcome distrust and asymmetric information problems. One 
can informally vouch for another’s character and this is more than a simple metric of 
creditworthiness. Moreover, decisions can be quick, and this can be quite significant given the 
bureaucratic and sclerotic nature of the formal system for lending. For example, one might 
require short term financing to meet the initial margin for delivery of a product and this can be 
                                                          
8 See [2013 Zhongguo yinhang ye diaocha baogao - Survey on the Chinese Banking Industry, 2013], KPMG.   
9  See, [Guang Ming Web]. Available from: http://politics.gmw.cn/2013-03/13/content_6993021.htm, [accessed 7.7.14].  
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an immediate and unexpected opportunity. Without access to standby bridging loans and a 
significant overdraft facility at a recognized bank a PE may miss out here.10  
 
   Anecdotally, it is widely known that sums of less than 100,000 RMB can be accessed within 
a matter of minutes in Wenzhou, and larger sums within 24 hours.11 Credibility is extremely 
important in the informal system and is built up through multiple interactions and based on a 
system of character vouching. Research by Wenzhou’s China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) indicates that 87% of PE borrowers in the informal system do so without 
any use of collateral, and only 63% personal loans with informal form of receipts.12 This, 
however, does not mean the system lacks risk assessment or rules. It may be flexible in terms 
of what loans may be given for, maturity dates and interest rates, but both sides have 
expectations and these are rooted in practices that are known to all parties. The most prevalent 
form of informal hui lending is chenghui. The extended family is an extremely significant set 
of relations in Chinese culture. Chenghui refers to borrowing or lending amongst the extended 
family. It is the typical first resort for financing since it involves the greatest degree of 
information and trust. Where one cannot rely on extended family yinbei become significant. 
Yinbei are professional intermediaries who bring together potential lending pools and 
borrowers. The role requires a high degree of personal credibility (though whether this is 
genuine integrity is a different matter), and as such there are relatively few yinbei, and each 
can be involved in many financing deals. As such, they are a potential source of concentration 
of risk if there should be a sudden problem within the informal lending system.13 As already 
noted, problems can be cyclical, as lending increases then informal institutions that speak to 
                                                          
10 Noted in [Jinggi ribao - Economic Daily] (2005). [Wenzhou minjian jiedai diaocha - Survey on Wenzhou Informal 
Lending], 10 June 2005, p.13. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
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issues of credibility rather than stark creditworthiness become more difficult to maintain, 
credibility (vouching etc) can be insufficient to establish creditworthiness; concomitantly, 
borrowers may be borrowing larger sums, at higher interest rates and based on more leverage, 
creating debt servicing problems (see Section 4 for how feedback loops here can be 
compounded). This is a particular problem in Wenzhou as a major centre for private enterprise 
and for informal lending. What has happened within Wenzhou may well be indicative of 
problems elsewhere, but one may also ask why the informal lending system is not as prominent 
or well developed in other localities. We have already drawn attention to geographic and 
cultural reasons but one may also draw attention here to the role of local government and of 
Wenzhou’s business associations.  
 
4. Local power – The roles of local government and business association  
The Chinese language has many aphorisms that are deployed in everyday conversation to 
convey longstanding principles and attitudes in shortened form. The two most common in the 
context of the use of local government power are:  ‘The mountains are high and the emperor is 
far away,’ (shan gao huang di yan) and ‘Lower ranks can always find a way round higher level 
policy,’ (shangyou zhengce; xiayou duice). There has always been a sense that distance from 
Beijing creates scope for local government to both fail to strictly adhere to central state policy 
and to creatively apply that policy. This has become an increasing possibility as the reform 
period has developed. It has to some degree been encouraged by the state, since there have 
been many instances where local initiatives have then been adopted nationally when found to 
be successful. What occurs then depends to some degree on the nature of the risks particular 
local government officials are prepared to take, which can then over time become a form of 
unofficial local policy framework. It is widely recognized that Wenzhou officials have made 
great efforts to develop and protect private enterprises, and have recognized the use of informal 
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financing as a means to fill a funding gap (see examples, Liu 1992; Parris 1993; Tsai 2000, 
2002, 2004; Zhou 2011). This began early in the reform process. In the 1980s local government 
overrode ideological distrust of private enterprise by sheltering them within different registered 
organization categories; many were registered as partnerships and treated similarly to 
collectives. This also allowed them to enjoy tax exemptions and favourable income tax rates. 
It has long been recognized locally that Wenzhou officials could be relied upon to simply 
ignore local informal lending practices as long as they did not result in disputes or attract 
national attention because of a local crisis.  
 
   Here tacit encouragement and tolerance of informal lending has flowed from several mutually 
reinforcing sources. During the communist period Wenzhou has experienced chronically low 
state investment. Wenzhou has not been a provincial or national investment priority (Parris 
1993). Wenzhou officials thus had no particularly strong vested interests embedded in existing 
state owned industry. Once alternatives became possible, officials were more inclined to see 
their merit. They provided potential employment, tax revenue, and sources of local investment, 
resulting in a wide variety of local material benefits. Informal lending underpinned the growth 
of PEs. Furthermore, local material benefits extended also to the enrichment of government 
officials in various quasi-legal ways. Cadres or ganbu are at the centre of their own wide-
ranging guanxi networks. Guanxi is a culturally specific practice of client-patron relations 
based on gift giving and expectations of reciprocal conduct. Over the reform period business 
activity has been highly regulated, requiring many permissions, licences and so forth. The 
system has gradually loosened in current anti-corruption campaign. However, cadres are still 
in a position to make life difficult for a business if they so wish. Fostering and accessing guanxi 
can thus be extremely useful. In this context, cadres relatives have enjoyed a local competitive 
advantage in terms of registering and operating private enterprises, and it has always been seen 
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as advantageous to develop links with family members of significant cadres or to ensure that 
cadres themselves have a stake (direct or indirect) in the success of a business (see Section 4).  
 
This extends also to the role of local business associations. Though local government has been 
broadly supportive of PEs and private enterprise in Wenzhou a parallel set of organizations 
have also developed that entrepreneurs have regularly called upon. Since the 1980s the state 
has fostered national and then regional and local ‘non-government associations’ (minjian 
xiehui). As in the case of state-sponsored trade unions in China these associations are not quite 
civil society organizations in the traditional sense of that term. They are quasi-corporatist 
entities intended to mediate between the state and a particular interest group but with the 
presumption that state concerns and interests form the prevailing context for eventual decision 
making. In Wenzhou these business associations include the Wenzhou General Chamber of 
Commerce, Wenzhou Private Enterprises Association and Wenzhou SME 
Association/Wenzhou SME Development Promotion Association. Wenzhou business 
associations have exerted a degree of unusual local autonomy in comparison to other local 
associations. As such, tacit support for informal lending from within the associations has 
provided another channel by which the practices have developed and grown on a local basis.  
 
   A key feature here has been a succession of charismatic and reform-minded high-ranking 
personnel within the associations. For example, Zhou Dewen, current chairman of the 
Wenzhou SME Association/Wenzhou SME Development Promotion Association is regularly 
cited as a key local agent. It is perhaps significant that Zhou Dewen is a member of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rather than a member of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). He also has a background in academia and private enterprise rather than state 
administration. As such, though required to be a representative of state policy he is also more 
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distanced from the state’s key networks. He is thus perceived as a more effective mediating 
figure between the state and the concerns of local businesses. This has recursive effects since 
a reputation for greater objectivity makes him also a candidate for policy reform posts, in turn 
increasing his and the association’s influence. Zhou is also vice president of the China 
Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, deputy director of the China committee of the 
APEC SME union, and a vice chairman of the World Economic and Trade Joint Promotion 
Agency. He has written for the Financial Times (China edition) and is currently a member of 
the drafting team for the “Wenzhou City Private Financing Regulation” initiative.  
 
   So, it seems clear that Wenzhou is a site where informal lending was able to develop because 
of contributing and conducive factors. Those include geographical and cultural factors and also 
the tacit support of key local agents of the state and business associations. It is important to 
note these are not necessarily negatives; Wenzhou has flourished as a site of private enterprise 
and PE growth. The core issue is rather the instability and vulnerabilities of the informal system 
as it has developed. It is important also to note that lack of a formal focus on PEs in the formal 
system and institutional weakness in the formal system have combined to exacerbate problems 
in and through informal lending. There is then some reciprocity in terms of the vulnerabilities 
here, and any attempt to address informal lending practices must also take these into account.   
  
5. Reciprocities between formal and informal financing   
Given that the banks in China are not a major source of lending for PEs one might expect that 
one could simply observe a strict demarcation between the formal and informal lending sectors 
based on the profile of clients (see for example, Cull and Xu 2003; Berger and Udell 2006; 
Ayyagari et al. 2010; Lu et al. 2012). This, however, has not been the case, and particularly so 
since the implementation of the 2004 Commercial Banking Law. The Law allows for incentives 
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to bank agents for the achievement of given targets. Bank agent’s salaries and bonuses are 
linked to lending (Shen et al. 2009). However, in addition to the reasons simply focus on larger 
SOEs, the highly bureaucratic nature of the formal lending system militates against a focus on 
PEs. This is particularly so since agents are encouraged to seek out larger volume borrowers 
and are required to provide evidence of creditworthiness that many PEs simply cannot provide. 
However, though PEs are not a priority, they can become an additional resource through which 
bank agents meet targets. For this to occur, agents can find themselves seeking ways to 
artificially enhance the apparent creditworthiness of PE borrowers as tested through the 
existent bureaucratic procedures. There is then a distortion built into the way commercial logic 
is applied (Chen et al. 2013, p. 2533). Bank agents are motivated to misrepresent PE accounts, 
and so the information made available from PEs is not just limited from the bank’s point of 
view, it is unreliable. PEs, meanwhile, find that their main interactions with banks do not 
conform to the strictures actually stated. The whole can then develop in pathological ways, 
which actually serve to exacerbate the potential for credit crisis caused by banks’ lack of 
integrity and irresponsibility (Cowton 2002).       
 
   Qualitative research and local investigative media identify a variety of problematic 
practices used by bank loan officers in Wenzhou.14 Two strategies in particular are designed 
to inflate the bank agent’s statistics through the manipulation of lending to PEs: 
 
(1) Vouching: the hui lending system and the role of yinbei has made PEs familiar with the 
practice of vouching for the creditworthiness of others in informal networks of lending. 
Bank loan officers have adapted this system. During the upward swing in a lending 
                                                          
14 For example, [Wenzhou ribao -Wenzhou Daily] (2011). [Wenzhou minjian jiedai guimo yue 1100 yiyuan - Amount of 
Wenzhou informal lending reaches 110 billion RMB], 22 July 2011, p. 6; [Zhongguo zhengquan bao - China Securities 
Journal] (2011), [Bufen zhongxiaofangqi shenxian gaolidai nitan - Many small and medium sized property enterprises 
deeply mired in usury], 20 October 2011, p. A3.  
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cycle, when officers are under pressure to expand lending, officers are motivated to 
persuade private entrepreneurs who can actually establish a formal credit history, and 
so more easily comply with the formal requirements for lending, to vouch for firms that 
cannot. Evidence suggests that officers either offer better terms and conditions to the 
existing customer or use the implied threat of the withdrawal of services. The practice 
may well provide some PEs with formal credit access that would otherwise be unduly 
denied. However, it also creates the potential for non-creditworthy firms to gain access. 
The bank is not in a position to adequately discriminate between the two because the 
loan officer is motivated to distort the typical procedures of diligence. Moreover, the 
bank officer has constructed a web of inter-relations of liabilities and if these are 
sufficient in number, then an economic shock or sudden credit crisis issue can produce 
contagion. Significantly, this contagion spreads across both the formal and informal 
sectors, because PEs borrow in both, and spreads from weaker firms to apparently 
stronger ones, since the latter can be engaged in vouching in both sectors. The self-
interested (essentially rent-seeking and sometimes criminal) activity of loan officers 
thus becomes a nodal point for contagion. This was widely reported, for example, 
during the 2011-2012 Wenzhou credit crisis. 15   
(2) The exploitation of guanxi: the development of guanxi creates readily accessible socio-
economic networks that a bank loan officer can seek to exploit (Dunfee and Warren, 
2001). Successful PE clients of banks do not just provide guarantees for other firms. In 
a curious reversal they can also become agents of the bank agent. Just as pressure can 
be placed for firms to engage in vouching, pressure can also be placed for firms to seek 
out other firms within their networks and encourage them to apply for credit. Again, 
                                                          
15 Recall the previously referred to paolu or ‘run away’ business owners. Of the 90 named in the media several were 
prominent entrepreneurs. See, for example, [Zhongguo zhengquan bao - China Securities Journal] (2011), [Bufen 
zhongxiaofangqi shenxian gaolidai nitan - Many small and medium sized property enterprises deeply mired in usury], 20 
October 2011, p. A3). 
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this is not necessarily a negative.16 It provides both PEs with access to lower interest 
rate formal credit and bank services. However, actual creditworthiness is not the basis 
of the process and the information upon which the lending is built remains questionable. 
And again, it is only at some point of crisis that any vulnerability becomes manifest. 
The bank is not in a position to place confidence in its own accounts.  
 
   So, there are clear motivations for bank agents (loan officers) to exploit institutional 
weaknesses within the formal a sector in ways that exacerbate problems in the informal lending 
system. In Section 3 we noted that local state officials have looked the other way as informal 
lending practices have developed because it has paid to do so, both for the local economy and 
for themselves. However, there is an additional issue here that is also significant. As already 
noted, interest rates in the informal lending system are considerably higher than they are in the 
formal system. Rates in the formal sector vary around 6-8%, whilst those in the informal system 
can be as high as 18-40% (Wu 2011). There are then significant credit transformation potentials 
between the formal and informal lending systems and this creates a powerful motivation for 
rent-seeking behaviours from any strategically positioned agent. Cadres (ganbu), local non-
government/business association agents, and bank agents have privileged access to credit from 
the formal system and so can take out loans, mediate with yinbei, and become a primary source 
of funding in hui in the informal sector. Cadres and business association agents, of course, also 
have significant networks and guanxi to expedite this process; bank agents, meanwhile, also 
have significant contact with business associations and well-connected PE entrepreneurs. 
Significantly, none of these agents can actually state on a loan application that the purpose of 
credit is to transfer lending from the formal to the informal system. As such, rent-seeking 
promotes misrepresentation within bank information systems (whilst the interest rate gap 
                                                          
16 (See for example, [Jinji ribao - Economic Daily] (2011), [Danbao gongsi yihua cheng dixia qianzhuang - Guarantee 
companies’ alienation into underground Banks], 10 October 2011, p. 4).   
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encourages agents to leverage themselves to increasingly dangerous levels – providing another 
way in which expanding debt arises).  
 
   Again, the whole creates vulnerability should a default or shock occur. According to local 
media and sources, there are many strategies used to undertake unofficial credit transformation. 
For example, cadres may take out additional debt on property (up to 70% of the value creating 
additional mortgage liabilities). Since cadres are able to demonstrate a good credit history (job 
security, stable income etc) they are able to access credit based on their rank (recently this has 
been 300,000 RMB for manager level cadres (keji) and 500,000 RMB for senior managers 
(juji).17 These strategies are ostensibly lacking in deceit, in so far as the borrower is not 
necessarily required to state the purpose of the loan (though good practice would require a bank 
officer to inquire and to make the borrower aware of the potential for problems). However, one 
must consider the effect of motive and mutual self-interest between different agents here. It can 
be simply understood that the purpose is to engage in transformations and so the bank officer 
will be tacitly in collusion; moreover the process can transition to one of simple manipulation. 
Officers may receive inducements to massage the figures in order to maximise lending and 
minimise scrutiny. Once these behaviours and relationships are embedded they can then move 
beyond the constraints of smaller scale property secured borrowing or relatively easily 
manageable unsecured loans related to legitimate declarations of income. All sides, particularly 
as the informal sector grows and returns on lending seem to be a one-way bet, have motives to 
seek any and all ways to shift capital from the formal to the informal sector. Again, the 
problems here are unintended consequences of the potentials of the system that has arisen.     
 
                                                          
17 [Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan - China Newsweek], cited by 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130926/154116860578.shtml. [accessed 22/07/14]. 
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   Since the processes involved are focused on misrepresentation, and agents have strong 
reputational incentives to cover up any emergent problems then evidence here is of varying 
quality (Beck et al. 2006). State agencies provide highly approximate estimations and the media 
are minded to publish investigative accounts during manifest crisis or in particularly egregious 
cases. During the events of 2011-2012, local media in Wenzhou and, as the crisis escalated, 
regional and national media, reported numerous cases of impropriety by cadres and business 
association agents (in one specific case 80% of participants in an informal lending scandal were 
officials).18 Given their role in credit transformations officials were accused of usury, and of 
simply perpetuating the problems of the formal system that require an informal system to exist 
(and in which there was always the potential for greed to escalate inherent weaknesses).19 
Concomitantly, in one case a bank loan officer repeatedly used a false property certificate to 
obtain a total of 16.52 million RMB that was then directed into the informal lending system.20 
It is also worthy of note that the state is acutely aware of the debilitating effects on public 
confidence in and perception of cadres and of the banking system (Pei 2008; Scott 1972; Rocca 
1992).  
 
   If considering the Wenzhou credit crisis of 2011-2012 in terms of a longer timeline for 
context, one might note that the seeds of this particular cycle were sown by central 
government’s response to the global financial crisis. The crisis resulted in disruption to China’s 
role as a key exporter in global supply chains and many export-oriented firms were forced to 
close, creating sudden widespread unemployment, uncertainty and fear. The state responded 
rapidly with a significant fiscal expansion and a loosening of monetary policy (Hou and Wang 
2013; and for context regarding back activity, see Berger and Udell 1998, 2006; Bernanke and 
                                                          
18See [Nanfang ribao - Nanfang Daily] (2011): [Wo bang ni banshi, ni bang wo fang gaolidai - I help you to return you help 
me for usury], 29 Sept 2011, p. A8.  
19 Ibid.  
20 http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130926/154116860578.shtml [accessed 21/07/14]. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
21 
 
Gertler 1995; Kakes 2000; Önder and Özyıldırım 2013). Over 4 trillion RMB was injected into 
the economy, and this involved also a directive to the state controlled banks to rapidly expand 
credit availability to support output and demand. As observed by Nguyen and Boateng (2015), 
there is a close relationship between the government’s monetary policy changes and risk-taking 
behaviour by Chinese banks. The rapid change in policy in a system used to top-down 
hierarchical lines of authority lead rapidly to pressure on bank loan officers to meet expanded 
loan quotas. This pressure was to persist as China continued to respond to slowing global 
demand (particularly as recession spread across Europe and growth remained slow in the US).  
 
   However, the scale of lending within the context of motives we have already identified, 
quickly translated into opportunities for capital to be concentrated in forms of investment 
behaviour that create bubbles, and also for capital to be diverted to the informal sector. If there 
is pressure for lending to rapidly increase in a situation of uncertainty for production then there 
is a tendency for capital to be focused on forms of investment that offer rentier varieties of 
return – so investment in property tends to increase. This is not irrational in a developing state 
such as China. There is a long term aspiration to refocus the economy or balance it with a 
greater proportion of GDP deriving from consumption – commercial property, including for 
retail, can readily appear to be a warranted form of investment focus; similarly, as China’s 
educated and urban middle class expands, the demand for higher quality residential property 
developments is also expected to rise, and so there seems a credible narrative for this kind of 
investment too.21 However, a sudden and rapid increase in investment in land and property 
based on readily available credit can quickly create a situation where prices are rising because 
of perceived scarcity, creating then a bubble effect, where investment becomes speculative i.e. 
participants are investing in order to benefit from the rapidly rising prices, and this is a highly 
                                                          
21 http://www.euromoney.com/Article/2942944/Real-estate-Property-throws-a-shadow-over-China.html [accessed 05/07/14].   
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unstable situation. The tendency for prices to rise attracts more participants but the whole is 
only sustained by the availability of credit and as the market heats up more credit is necessarily 
required to maintain the expanding bubble. According to the People’s Bank of China, in the 
second quarter of 2011, new bank loans issued to property developers increased to 169 billion 
RMB from 42 billion RMB in the first quarter.22 In so far as a febrile atmosphere can quickly 
arise in which many seem to be getting rich quickly (albeit much of the wealth is essentially 
notional based on values of properties and balanced by the debt each is carrying that anchors 
ownership of any asset) others are attracted to the activity and so any agent able to offer access 
to credit can find themselves positioned to make personal gains.  
 
   Ultimately, the system increases in vulnerability as debt levels rise, because the interest rate 
sensitivity of borrowers also rises, and their dependence on credit is increased. At some point 
the whole can then be subject to a collapse and these become a positive feedback loop through 
contagion effects. In the 2012 case the collapse was set in motion relatively slowly as the 
central bank, the People’s Bank of China, began to ratchet up interest rates. The People’s Bank 
raised interest rates five times between October 2010 and August 2012. It also increased the 
mandatory reserve requirement ratio (RRR) of the banks (reducing their capacity to lend) 12 
times during the same period.23 Formal credit thus became both more expensive and scarcer. 
Since loans were often given for a 3 month period in the formal system, many borrowers 
quickly found themselves needing to renew their lending (which was then denied, forcing them 
further into the informal sector, which itself was also then under pressure). Illiquidity and 
insolvency necessarily followed and this quickly spread through formal and informal 
                                                          
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
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connections that had been constructed in ways we have already referred to. At the height of the 
crisis in 2012 the number of commercial lawsuits increased by 61% from 2011 (to 19,446).24  
 
The key points to take forward here are that the real lending system in China, as illustrated by 
Wenzhou, is complex, exhibits various institutional weaknesses based on emergent 
opportunities, is clearly unstable in so far as it is prone to its own variants of financial cycle, 
and is one that profoundly affects the scope of activity of PEs. As this section also illustrates, 
a system that maintains PEs access to credit for ordinary everyday business activity and for 
investment can be hijacked during a cycle of credit expansion, and so PEs are at best 
constrained and worst materially damaged by the real context of credit availability that exists 
in China. This leads us to consider issues of reform of the system.  
  
6. Policy changes and implications: Reform from 2013 and its limits 
 
It is noted at the beginning of this paper that reform in China tends to be undertaken 
incrementally and gradually, often with an initial local experimental basis that is then 
generalised across the state if found to be effective. Since Wenzhou in particular, and the 
province of Zhejiang in general, have emerged as a notable site for entrepreneurship and the 
promotion and development of PEs, and this itself has then resulted in heightened forms of 
problems that exist to lesser degrees elsewhere, it is unsurprising that Wenzhou and Zhejiang 
should also be notable as locations for reform of those arising problems and that the state should 
be particularly interested in this. The state, the province and the city all have vested interests 
in preventing debilitating credit crises.25   As such, considerable publicity has surrounded 
                                                          
24[Nanfang ribao - Nanfang Daily] (2011): [Wo bang ni banshi, ni bang wo fang gaolidai - I help you to return you help me 
for usury], 29 Sept 2011, p. A8. 
 
25 For a general discussion of regulatory decentralisation see Du and Xu (2009).  
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Wenzhou’s response to the events of 2012. In November 2013, the Standing Committee of the 
12th People’s Congress of Zhejiang Province approved an appointed Wenzhou working 
committee’s ‘Wenzhou City Private Financing Regulation’ and this was then implemented 
from March 2014.26 The regulation was heralded as ground-breaking for two reasons. First, it 
formally recognizes the existence of the informal lending sector and second, it provides a set 
of rules for dispute resolution in the informal sector.  As such, it potentially provides a set of 
hitherto lacking legal protections at a municipal and provincial level.   
 
   Three specific components of the regulation are worth noting here. First, the regulation 
allows informal lending to be formalised through the establishment of private finance 
management companies. These effectively become a recognized tier in the finance system and 
so informal lending potentially gains from greater transparency, and the state is able to more 
effectively monitor such activity. Second, in so far as the potential for informal lending is now 
formally recognized, any informal lending activity involving a single transaction above 3 
million RMB or more than 30 participants in a lending scheme, is now subject to registration 
with a relevant authority designated by the city. As such, the state is potentially able to monitor 
and track the volume and scale of significant informal lending activity. Third, since the 
informal sector has arisen in response to a need for financing from private PEs, the regulation 
also empowers PEs to issue bonds and equity to directly finance themselves. 
 
   The three stated components are all positive steps forward, but let us consider what they are 
and what they are not. The first two components are attempts to improve the adequacy of 
information regarding informal lending and to increase the state’s capacity to control that 
lending. However, neither of these two components can prevent informal lending continuing 
                                                          
26 The working committee was focused around “The Overall Programme of Comprehensive Financial Reform for Pilot Area 
in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province” set by the State Council in March 2012, known as the “12 targets” 
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to occur in the ways that it did before. Whether that activity transfers to private finance 
management companies and whether those liable to undertake informal lending are minded to 
register their activity will depend on whether the new system is enforceable and deemed also 
to be effective and desirable by those currently liable to engage in informal finance practices. 
This is something of an open issue and involves issues of trust and finance (see Colledge et al. 
2014; Morgan and Sheehan 2015). One can at least note here though that if the intent is to 
increase information and control for the state then there may be occasions where the interest 
and motivations of other agents conflict with those of the state. As such, the new system may 
simply be bypassed, particularly if it is experienced as bureaucratic and slow, precisely because 
it requires more information, checks and balances than the prior informal system. The current 
hui system is already embedded and so may not simply disappear under such circumstances, 
and if and when opportunities for expansionary credit cycles (and also asset bubbles) arise, 
informal lending may again simply exceed or exploit the gaps in the existent system. However 
this does not make regulatory reform irrelevant or pointless, it is a major step forward for legal 
protections and recognitions to exist, these may ultimately motivate a transition into more 
formalised aspects of informal lending. But, consider here also the third component. This is 
essentially recognition that entrepreneurs and PEs are often starved of capital. It creates an 
opportunity for firms to raise capital more effectively than in the past. But not all PEs are in a 
position to do this, which is precisely why banks and hui exist as source of financing. Moreover, 
the third component is only necessary because of continued failings in the formal lending 
system, where the state banks continue to dominate and continue to focus their financing 
activity on larger SOEs. The regulation is then not a fundamental solution to the adverse focus 
of the banking system. This is an issue that needs further consideration, and cannot be resolved 
at a municipal or provincial level. It requires a continued evolution of the banking system and 
this can only be led by the state. In the meantime, PEs still face difficult conditions in accessing 
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finance. To some degree this is also encoded in the new regulation. The regulation does not 
directly specify an interest rate threshold, and so does not prevent PEs becoming dependent on 
sources of finance subject to significantly higher interest rates.27  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we provide an in-depth discussion focused on why formal and informal lending 
have coexisted in China, and how they have interacted. This is illustrated using a primary yet 
a typical case –Wenzhou (the national capital of both “informal lending” and “private 
enterprise”). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address the ambiguities and 
complexities of the case in context. Our findings and contributions to the literature can be 
summarised from three perspectives. Firstly, although significant literature has examined the 
origin, scope and impact of informal lending to private enterprises, our paper explores this issue 
with reference to the complexity and reciprocity of relations that bear on the formal lending 
sector. Notably highlighting institutional weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and so bringing to the 
fore otherwise obscure causal connections via which PEs can be discriminated against by state-
owned and controlled banks. Discrimination extends to prejudicial interest rates and 
substandard service. We also bring to the fore additional matters of context, notably the role of 
tightening monetary policy within the formal banking system, which tends to increase the 
current dependence on the informal system for those who need access to financing. One can 
consider this as a push factor within the informal lending crisis 2011-2012. Others include the 
arbitrary power potentials abused and exploited by bank loan officers, which caused instability 
and vulnerabilities within the informal system, and also the contagion effects or economic 
shock arising from credit crisis. Secondly, our paper highlights the role of specific informal 
                                                          
27 Though if one contextualises this with criminal codes in relation to usury one can expect a limit of four times the formal 
bank rate.       
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lending practices in localities such as Wenzhou. We note that geographical, cultural and 
political factors are relevant for real causal processes. For example, regarding tacit support of 
key local agents of the state, business associations and other influential figures. These explain 
why Wenzhou in particular, became a site where informal lending was able to develop 
(constituting contributing and conducive factors). However, it remains the case that Wenzhou’s 
experience is relevant to differing degrees elsewhere in China. Thirdly, and concomitantly, 
Wenzhou was designated by the state as a site for reform of the informal lending system. This 
followed the Chinese model of experimental, incremental and gradual reform. Our paper 
provides a detailed analysis, including policy implications, of the three components of the 
ground-breaking new regulation - ‘the Wenzhou City Private Financing Regulation’. We 
conclude that despite positive potential, limitations are apparent, which requires fundamental 
changes in institutional structure and legislation.  Ultimately, then one is left wondering how 
the system will evolve. Key questions remain: will the regulation prevent crises, and will the 
state build on the regulation to promote a better system of financing for PEs?28  Finally, we can 
conclude that the Wenzhou case could prove, as argued by Pagliari and Young (2014) that 
leveraged power can be used by financial regulatory policymakers in a specific location of the 
economy.    
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